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I. INTRODUCTION

On August 22, 1996, President William Jefferson Clinton signed
legislation intended to "end welfare as we know it."77 1 H.R. 3734,
otherwise known as the "Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996 '' 772 (PRWORA), is designed to fix our
"fundamentally broken" welfare system. 773 In many ways controversial,
this Act embodies the recognition on the part of the federal government
that it has failed to solve the most basic of human problems during the last
half century. 7
By transferring much of the responsibility from federal to state and
local levels, PRWORA effectively dismantles the old welfare system.
Under the new system, states will receive block grants for time-limited
cash assistance based on particular eligibility standards. Open-ended
federal entitlement programs will disappear as lawmakers attempt to
promote personal responsibility and accountability, and to encourage
individuals to move from welfare to work.7 75
To accomplish these goals, the new law permits states and local
governments to contract directly with charitable and religious
organizations to provide government-funded benefits and services to
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needy families and individuals. 776 This so-called "charitable choice"
provision is the subject of this article.
The "charitable choice" provision presents a tremendous opportunity
to involve local communities in the process of reform. By promoting
partnership between government and nongovernmental organizations,
lawmakers may solve some of the intractable problems of welfare. But
will this partnership survive challenge under the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment?
This article explores the controversy that may arise as states and local
governments begin to forge business relationships with religious
organizations. Specifically, this article analyzes the continuing attempt by
the Supreme Court to define policy concerning these relationships. Section
II begins with a discussion of Establishment Clause jurisprudence. This
part traces the Supreme Court s movement from a policy of strict
separation of church and state towards one based more on neutrality.
Section III examines the impact of this standard on interpretation of the
"charitable choice" provision. Section IV concludes by suggesting that
state legislatures proceed cautiously when enacting laws under the new
PRWORA provision.

II. BACKGROUND OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE

The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment provides that
777
"Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion."
While the Clause primarily proscribes sponsorship, financial support, and
active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity, ' '778 it implies an
even broader 9division, one that Thomas Jefferson described as a "wall of
77
separation."
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The Supreme Court first described this concept in 1947 in Everson v.
780
Board of Education. In that case, the Court considered a state busing
program that reimbursed the parents of parochial school children.

Although the Court upheld the statute, Justice Black advanced the notion
that the proper relationship between religion and state was one of strict
separation. 7 81 According to Justice Black, the wall between church and
state was necessary
to prevent government from advancing or inhibiting
782
any religion.
Recognizing that such absolute separation is often undesirable and at

times unavoidable, the Supreme Court has not remained faithful to this
inflexible standard. Instead of building a taller wall, the Court has shifted

towards a requirement that the government remain neutral towards
religion

and

religious

organizations. 783

As

the

following

cases

demonstrate, defining the term "neutral" is the real challenge.
A. The Lemon Test
After Everson, the leading case involving Establishment Clause
jurisprudence is Lemon v. Kurtzman.784 In Lemon, the Court devised a

three-prong test for reviewing Establishment Clause challenges. First, the
statute must have a secular legislative purpose; 785 second, its principal or
nor inhibits religion;786

primary effect must be one that neither advances
and third, the statute must not foster an "excessive government

entanglement with religion." 787 These tests have become the customary

guidelines for determining when the objectives of the Establishment
Clause have been impaired through government involvement in a religious
activity.7 8 8 They provide the means for ensuring that States pursue "a
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course of 'neutrality
789
nonreligion."

among religions,

and between

religion

and

Of the three prongs of the Lemon test, the last two have generated a
great deal of debate. 7 90 While the Court is generally quick to recognize
and either accept or reject the legitimacy of a statute s secular legislative
purpose, it is more circumspect when contemplating "effect" and
"entanglement". 791 Both elements are certain to play an important role in
the constitutional analysis of the PRWORA provision.
1. The Effects Cases
The second prong of the Lemon analysis requires that a statute s
"principal or primary effect" be one that neither advances nor inhibits
• 792
•
religion.
An early case in which the Court considered this prong was
Meek v. Pittenger.7 93 In Meek, Justice Stewart held that the direct loan of
instructional material and equipment to non-public elementary and
secondary schools was unconstitutional where the schools benefitting
from the act were predominantly of a religious character. 794 Justice
Stewart opined that "[e]ven though earmarked for secular purposes, 'when
it flows to an institution in which religion is so pervasive that a substantial
portion of its functions are subsumed in the religious mission,' state aid
has the impermissible primary effect of advancing religion." 795 In other
words, funding which knowingly or unknowingly aids religious
indoctrination is unconstitutional.7 9 6
In a similar case, the Court held that a school district s shared time and
community education programs, which provided classes to religious
parochial school students at public expense also had a "primary or
principal" effect of advancing religion. 7 97 In School District of City of
Grand Rapids v. Ball, Justice Brennan described three ways in which the
programs promoted religion. 7 98 First, paying instructors with state money
would lead to subtle, if not overt, indoctrination of students into particular
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religious tenets at public expense. 799 Second, the
perceive the "symbolic union" of church and state
support for religion. 80 0 Last, the programs' subsidy
teaching functions of1the parochial schools would
8
sectarian enterprise. 0

general public would
as a message of state
effect on the religious
necessarily advance a

These cases demonstrate the Court s concern over the primary or
principal effect of government aid to religious activities. Government
involvement does not however, have to be as overt as in Meek or Ball. As
the Court said in Lemon, "[t]he prohibition against governmental
endorsement of religion 'preclude[s] government from conveying or
attempting to convey a message that religion or a particular religious
belief is favored or preferred.' 80 2 In other words, government should
attempt to remain
neutral by avoiding even the "appearance of
80 3
endorsement."
2. Excessive Entanglement
Excessive entanglement led the Court in Lemon to invalidate a statute
providing reimbursement to private schools for teacher s salaries and
instructional materials. According to the Court, any attempt to keep
separate the secular from the religious would
be "fraught with the sort of
80 4
"
forbids.
Constitution
the
that
entanglement
The administrative oversight requirements also troubled the Court in
Meek and Ball. In both cases, the Court found the monitoring, while
necessary to avoid the risk of state-sponsored indoctrination, created
excessive entanglement.
Similarly, in Aguilar v. Felton, the Court held that a federal program
which involved sending public school teachers into religious schools
violated the Establishment Clause. 80 5 Relying on the important elements
of Lemon and Meek, the Aguilar Court noted the religious environment in
which the aid was to be provided, as well as the inspection that would be
required to ensure there was no endorsement of religion. 80 6 The
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"permanent and pervasive state presence" led the Court to again find
80 7
excessive entanglement.
It is apparent from these cases that excessive entanglement will
generally be found wherever there is a government presence in a sectarian
organization. Moreover, the monitoring and surveillance necessary to
ensure there is no improper effect will generally lead to excessive
entanglement under Lemon, and thus be deemed unconstitutional.
B. The PresentandFuture ofLemon
For over twenty-five years, Lemon has guided Establishment Clause
jurisprudence. Nevertheless, several members of the Court have expressed
dissatisfaction with its application. 80 8 While Lemon has not been officially
abandoned, its intermittent use has created confusion and frustration even
among the Justices themselves. Two cases decided in 1993 are illustrative
of this point.
In Zobrest v. CatalinaFoothills School District,8 9 the Court chose not
to apply the Lemon test. Holding that the Establishment Clause did not
prohibit a school district from providing a sign-language interpreter to a
deaf student at a parochial school, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote "[w]e
have never said that 'religious institutions are disabled by the First
Amendment from participating in publicly sponsored social welfare
programs."' 810 Without substantive elaboration, Rehnquist continued that
government programs are not necessarily subject to Establishment Clause
challenge if such programs "neutrally provide benefits to a broad class of
citizens defined without reference to religion .... ,,8 11 The five-member
Zobrest majority effectively ignored Lemon and the concerns of
entanglement or effect on its way to deciding the case.
Surprisingly, the Court did apply Lemon in Lamb s Chapel v. Center
Moriches Union Free School District,812 a case decided just eleven days
before Zobrest. In that case, the Court considered the issue of whether a
807
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school could deny a church permission to use school facilities in order to
show a religiously based film series. 813 The justices unanimously agreed
that in a non-public forum, decisions regarding access must be "reasonable
...and viewpoint neutral., 8 14 The Court found that the school district s
refusal to allow the church to show its film was not viewpoint neutral.
Because the church s use of the school property did not promote an
establishment of religion under the Lemon
test, the Court found no
815
justification for the school district s action.
The Court in Zobrest did not explicitly overrule Lemon. However, the
failure of the Court to apply the familiar test may signal that a new method
for analyzing Establishment Clause cases is forthcoming. Based on the
reasoning of both Zobrest and Lamb s Chapel it is reasonable to assume
that neutrality of government involvement will be the most important
factor in the Court s analysis.

III. CHARITABLE CHOICE
Section 104 of the PRWORA gives states the option to contract with
charitable, religious, or private organizations for the distribution of public
assistance benefits.8 16 The law requires that such programs be
"implemented consistent with the Establishment Clause of the United
States Constitution."' 817 Determining which actions are permissible and
which are not will turn on whether the Lemon test is applied or not. For
the sake of argument this article will consider both scenarios.
A. If Lemon is applied
A state program in which a religious entity is empowered to administer
government- funded welfare benefits is likely to fail under both the
"effects" and "entanglement" prongs of the Lemon test. Following the line
of reasoning used in Meek and Ball, any funding given to a pervasively
sectarian enterprise has the impermissible effect of advancing religion.
Although the charitable choice provision explicitly states that "[n]o funds
provided directly to institutions or organizations to provide services and
administer programs . . . shall be expended for sectarian worship,
instruction, or proselytization[J,]8 1 8 indoctrination into the tenets of a
particular religion is a principle mission of any church. Church-members
may have trouble administering food for the body, but not for the soul. As
Chief Justice Burger recognized in Lemon, "a dedicated religious person.
813
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• . will inevitably experience great difficulty in remaining religiously
neutral."8 19
A secondary effect of using churches as distribution points for
government aid is the "symbolic union" that is created between that
particular church group and the government. Even though no direct
preference may be intended, the general public will perceive the
cooperative effort as a symbol of government support and approval for a
particular religion. 820 The "appearance of endorsement" will be
inescapable.
The second reason a church/government relationship is likely to fail
under Lemon is for "excessive entanglement." In order to ensure proper
disbursement of government benefits, states will have to monitor the
activities of participating religious organizations. Such monitoring will
include regular audits of church accounts and regular visits to ensure the
absence of religious inculcation. This continuous surveillance will create
the same excessive entanglement found impermissive in Lemon, Meek,
and Ball.
B. If Lemon is not applied
In many ways, states will have an even more difficult time predicting
the constitutional outcome if Lemon is not applied. The standard outlined
by Chief Justice Rehnquist in Zobrest requires only that benefits be
neutrally provided to a broad class of citizens defined without reference to
religion.
Certainly the class of citizens receiving public assistance is
broadly defined. Because eligibility is based solely on economics, no
reference to religious participation is required to qualify for government
aid. But how can states neutrally provide benefits when the process of
selecting a religious organization with which to contract requires some
showing of preference or favoritism? Which denominations will get to
participate? Which will not? Who will decide whether Catholic Charities
USA or the Church of Scientology is a better organization to provide
benefits? The potential for lawsuits alleging discrimination against the
non-selected religions is vast.
Further, religious institutions cannot be expected to remain neutral and
uninvolved. Once they become part of the process, religious groups will
form their own views about welfare reform. The next step is down the
slippery slope of religious involvement in the political process. Once
819 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 618 (1971).
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sectarian groups begin to line up on either side of the argument,
government will find itself stuck in the middle trying not to show
favoritism by endorsing one plan over another. It is a situation which
stands in stark contrast to the notion that the "Establishment Clause 'rests
upon the premise that both religion and government can best work to
achieve their lofty aims if each is left free from the other within its
respective sphere."' 822 In short, as states try be involved with religion and
yet remain neutral, they will learn what the framers of the First
Amendment already knew: "a union of government
and religion tends to
823
destroy government and degrade religion."

IV. CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court s current Establishment Clause doctrine is a
quagmire of unpredictable analyses and results. Until the Lemon doctrine
is formally replaced however, states should use the three-prong analysis
for determining whether proposed legislation risks violating the
Establishment Clause. Hence, the best strategy appears to be what many
states are already doing: waiting. By proceeding slowly with
implementation of charitable choice, states may soon see a more definitive
statement by the Supreme Court.
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